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COMMENTS

EVIDENCE-WITN ESSES-DEADMAN

STATUTES-CORROBORATION.*-In

all

but five American jurisdictions the common law disqualification of interested persons as witnesses is retained only in suits against a decedent's estate.' The primary
purpose of these Dead Man Statutes 2 is to protect the estate from fraudulent
claims. In five jurisdictions3 the disqualification is completely abolished. In four
jurisdictions, including New Mexico, 4 the interested person's testimony is insufficient to support a verdict unless it is corroborated. 5 The New Mexico type
statute represents an attempt to retain some safeguard against fraudulent claims6
while avoiding the frustration of valid claims that frequently results from
absolute disqualification. Both types of statutes present an initial problem of
determining applicability. In addition, the New Mexico type statute requires the
courts to fashion a standard for corroboration. The definition of corroborative
evidence and the amount required to satisfy statutory standards has varied con7
siderably, despite similarity in statutes.
In Porter v. Porter," the most recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme
Court involving this statute, the plaintiff, divorced from his wife seventeen
years prior to her death, sought a declaratory judgment that certain property
was separate and not community property. The defendants were children of
the marriage. The supreme court held, one justice dissenting, 9 that the statute
was applicable to the suit, and it accepted the trial court's finding that the
plaintiff's testimony was not corroborated. 10
*Porter v. Porter, 65 N.M. 14, 331 P.2d 360 (1958).
1. Wigmore, Evidence § 575 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Wigmore, Evidence § 578 (3d ed. 1940). The statutes are collected in Wigmore,
Evidence § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-145 (1958) ; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2282 (Dart 1945)
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 20 (1956) ; R.I. Gen. Law Ann. § 9-17-12 (1956) ; S. D. Code
§ 36.0101 (Supp. 1960).
4. D. C. Code Ann. § 14-302 (1951) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-5 (1953) ; Va. Code Ann.
§ 8-286 (1950) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 116.555 (1953), (requires "some competent satisfactory
evidence other than the testimony of the claimant"). Ontario had one of the first statutes
of this type. See Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 119, § 11 (1937). New Mexico was the first U. S.
jurisdiction to adopt the intermediate approach. See N.M. Sess. Law, 1880, ch. 12, § 8.
5. Before the 1949 amendment the statute read: "In a suit by or against the heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, an opposite or interested
party to the suit shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision therein, on his own
evidence, in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person,
unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-2-5 (1953). It was amended to read: "In a suit by or against the heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns of a deceased person, a claimant, interested or opposite party
shall not obtain a judgment or decision on his own evidence, in respect of any matter
occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is supported by
some other material evidence tending to corroborate the claimant or interested person."
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-5 (Supp. 1959).
6. Wigmore, Evidence § 578, at 697 (3d ed. 1940).
7. See text infra at notes 24-25.
8. 65 N.M. 14, 331 P.2d 360 (1958).
9. McGhee, J. urged that the statute did not apply because the suit was not against
an estate but was merely to determine the ownership of property. 65 N.M. 14, 19, 331
P.2d 360, 363 (1958). See discussion in text at note 14 infra.
10. Plaintiff contended that the separate property that he owned prior to his marriage
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The courts are faced with a logical dilemma in making the initial determination on the question of the applicability of the Dead Man Statute. The California and Idaho Dead Man Statutes" which refer to actions "upon a claim or
demand against the estate" of a decedent, have been construed as limited to
actions for a money judgment. 12 Thus these states conclude that their statutes
are inapplicable to cases involving the issue of ownership of property,' 3 thereby
appearing to avoid a determination for the purpose of trial that the property in
question belongs to one of the parties.' 4 These courts reason that in such cases
the plaintiff is merely pursuing his own property.' 5 This approach is explainable,
at least in part, by the fact that these states have a broad Dead Man Statute and
the courts are anxious to avoid its proscriptions.' The broader wording of the
New Mexico statute which applies to a "suit by or against"' 7 an estate would
make the narrow construction adopted by California and Idaho difficult. Furthermore, it would be undesirable to adopt the fiction used in those states
because it runs counter to the policy of the statute of preventing fraudulent
claims. Such claims may arise in a suit like Porter as well as others. Furthermore, the California position that the plaintiff in a Porter type suit is merely
pursuing his own property does not avoid a determination of ownership for the
purpose of trial. It determines that the property belongs to the plaintiff-thus
eliminating the protection the statute was intended to afford the estate. Because
in 1905 was the source of all the property in question. To corroborate his testimony he
offered: (1) testimony of two women that he owned a drugstore and had another business
and appeared to be a man of means before his marriage, Record, p. 255-59, Porter v.
Porter, 65 N.M. 14, 331 P.2d 360 (1958) ; (2) testimony of a farmer that he had business
transactions with the plaintiff before the latter's marriage and that the plaintiff had
operated the drugstore for 3 or 4 years after which it was sold and another business
purchased, Record, p. 178-79; (3) stock certificates issued to him in the businesses with
which he was associated during his marriage, Record, p. 190-216; (4) testimony of
plaintiff's bookkeeper of the increase of the plaintiff's business and his income from the
business, Record, p. 158-59.
11. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1880; Idaho Code Ann. § 9-202 (1947).
12. Myers v. Reinstein, 67 Cal. 89, 7 Pac. 192 (1885).
13. Bollinger v. Wright, 143 Cal. 292, 76 Pac. 1108 (1904) ; Myers v. Reinstein, 67
Cal. 89, 7 Pac. 192 (1885) ; Cunningham v. Stoner, 10 Idaho 549, 79 Pac. 228 (1905).
14. Ibid.
15. Brunson v. Babb, 145 Cal. App. 2d 214, 302 P.2d 647 (1956); Cunningham v.
Stoner, 10 Idaho 549, 79 Pac. 228 (1905) ; compare Justice McGhee's dissenting opinion
in Porter v. Porter, 65 N.M. 14, 19, 331 P.2d 360, 363 (1958).
16. E.g., Brunson v. Babb, note 15 supra. (The statute was not applied in a suit against
an estate to recover the reasonable value of services rendered to the decedent because the
plaintiff alleged a trust theory instead of a debt.) Accord, Holland v. Bank of Italy Nat'l
Trust and Say. Ass'n, 115 Cal. App. 472, 1 P.2d 1031 (1931) (Plaintiff sued executor on
two counts for $11,500, the first for money loaned to decedent; the second count alleging
that the same money was held in trust for plaintiff by the decedent. The statute prevented
plaintiff's testimony on the second count from being considered on the first count.) See
Adams v. Herman, 106 Cal. App.2d 92, 234 P.2d 695 (1951) in which the Dead Man
Statute was held to be applicable because the allegations were insufficient to support trust
theory. One California writer terms this result incongruous and irrational. Chadbourn,
History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A Proposal for Liberalization, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1.75, 189 (1957).
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-5 (Supp. 1959).
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the New Mexico statute permits the corroborated testimony of the claimant to
sustain a verdict, it is unnecessary to limit the application of the statute to avoid
its effects. Therefore, the view adopted in Porter is more consistent with the
language of the statute and its purpose than the view adopted in California and
Idaho.
The second problem raised by Porter concerns the corroboration requirement.
Prior to the 1959 amendment,' 8 the governing New Mexico statute provided
that the interested person's testimony was insufficient to sustain a verdict unless
"corroborated by some other material evidence." In Porter the court reiterated
the rule in New Mexico that "corroborating evidence must be such as would,
standing alone and unsupported by the evidence of the claimant, tend to prove
the essential allegations or issues raised by the pleading."19 This formulation
originally stemmed from the court's rejection of the definition of general corroboration in Gildersleeve v. Atkinson,20 and from its construction of the statutory
requirement of materiality. 21 This formulation was not required by the wording
of the statute 22 or to accomplish its purpose. 23 Decisions prior to Porterextended
18. Note 5 supra.
19. 65 N.M.14, 16, 331 P.2d 360, 362 (1958).
20. Gildersleeve v. Atkinson, 6 N.M. 250, 27 Pac. 477 (1891) established the definition
of corroborative evidence under this statute that has been followed or at least stated by
most cases concerned with the statute. The court found two types of corroboration, general,
and special or technical. It said that general corroborative evidence is for "no other function than to aid other evidence of a like or different character in giving it additional
weight. Such other evidence, so aided, may or may not be sufficient of itself; that is the
question for the jury." Id. at 257, 27 Pac. at 479. Technical corroborating evidence on the
other hand is "a substantive quantum of evidence without which the case of the party who
is compelled to produce it must inevitably fail." 6 N.M. at 257, 27 Pac. at 479. Because technical corroboration was required in certain criminal cases, and was thought to be analagous the rule in the criminal cases was adopted and that corroborative evidence was
"something other than that which goes to the credibility of the witness solely." 6 N.M. at
259, 27 Pac. at 479. The rule the court stated was: "Corroborating evidence is such evidence as tends, in some degree, of its own strength and independently, to support some
essential allegation or issue raised by the pleadings testified to by the witness whose evidence is sought to be corroborated, which allegation or issue, if unsupported, would be
fatal to the case; and such corroborating evidence must of itself, without the aid of any
other evidence, exhibit its corroborative character by pointing with reasonable certainty to
the allegation or issue which it supports. And such evidence will not be material unless the
evidence sought to be corroborated itself supports the allegation or point in issue." 6 N.M.
at 260-61, 27 Pac. at 480 (1891).
21. The Gildersleeve court in originally construing the statute found that the corroborating evidence required must tend to prove a substantive fact and stated its rule "keep' " Gildering in mind . . . that the evidence must be 'some other material evidence ..
sleeve v. Atkinson, 6 N.M. 250, 260, 27 Pac. 477, 480 (1891). The rule stated by the court,
supra note 20, is itself consistent with the definition of material evidence in Black, Law Dictionary 1128 (4th ed. 1951) ("Such as is relevant and goes to the substantial matters in
dispute . . ").
22. Ontario's statute, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 119, § 11 (1937), is nearly identical to N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-5 (1953) ; that court held that "the corroboration the statute requires is
not corroboration of every material fact which is required to be proved in order to entitle
the party to succeed, but only of such material facts as lead to the conclusion that the
testimony of the party is true." McGregor v. Curry, 20 D.L.R. 706, 709 (1914).
23. Virginia, which has the same type statute as New Mexico, Va. Code Ann. § 8-286
(1950), holds that the "law does not require the testimony of such an adverse witness
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the Gildersleeve rule. Despite the fact that the court in Gildersleeve said simply
that the corroboration must go to "some" essential allegation, 24 subsequent decisions appear to hold that every essential allegation must be corroborated. 25 This
requirement places an undue burden on the claimant and seems to ignore the
primary purpose of the New Mexico statute, i.e., to alleviate the inequities
26
created by the typical Dead Man Statute.
to be corroborated in every particular ....
" Burton's Ex'r. v. Manson, 142 Va. 500,
509, 129 S.E. 356, 359 (1925).
24. Note 20 supra. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-5 (1953) also required only "some other
material evidence." (Emphasis supplied.) Ontario found under an identical statute that
the corroboration requirement did not apply to each essential allegation. McGregor v.
Curry, 20 D.L.R. 706 (1914).
25. Vehn v. Bergman, 57 N.M. 351, 258 P.2d 734 (1953) (evidence offered in corroboration did not refer to the details of the oral agreement relied upon by the plaintiff) ;
Gillespie v. O'Neil, 38 N.M. 141, 28 P.2d 1040 (1934) (indicates that evidence tending
to show issue not sufficient unless other matters also corroborated) ; In re Cardoner's
Estate, 27 N.M. 105, 196 Pac. 327 (1929) (evidence that plaintiff had a claim in some
amount did not corroborate allegation of a claim for $3500) ;Childers v. Hubbel, 15 N.M.
450, 110 Pac. 1051 (1910) (unpaid checks not corroboration for allegation that checks
were for a certain purpose). But see Lusk v. Daugherty, 61 N.M. 157, 280 P.2d 1053
(1955) (court admitted that every claim not corroborated in every detail) ; In re
Baldwin's Will, 58 N.M. 370, 271 P.2d 404 (1954) (testimony that claimant had not
received payment of note not corroborated).
26. Although the New Mexico rule precluded the use of evidence tending only to
show credibility as corroborative evidence, other states with similar statutes hold that
such evidence is corroborative. See McGregor v. Curry, 20 D.L.R. 706 (1914) ;Voyer v.
Lepage, 19 D.L.R. 52 (1914), interpreting Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 119, § 11 (1937) ("In an
action by or against the heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators or assigns of a
deceased person, an opposite or interested party shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or
decision, on his own evidence, in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the
deceased person, unless such evidence iscorroborated by some other material evidence.")
and Burton's Ex'r. v. Manson, 142 Va. 500, 129 S.E. 356 (1925), interpreting Va. Code
Ann. § 8-286 (1950) ("no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse
or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimony . . ."). Virginia requires that
there be such corroboration "as would confirm and strengthen the belief of the jury
in the testimony of the witness," Id. at 509, 129 E.E. at 359, and that the testimony of
the claimant need not be corroborated in every particular, Rorer v. Taylor, 182 Va. 49,
27 S.E.2d 923 (1943).
The ad hoc nature of the Virginia approach seems undesirable. The rule stated is:
"Whether corroboration exists and the degree and quality required are to be determined
by the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Clay v. Clay, 196 Va. 997, 1002, 86
S.E. 2d 812, 815 (1955) (action by surviving husband to recover on alleged oral promise
by deceased wife to devise real estate) ; Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 64 S.E.2d
813 (1951) (action by children of testatrix against testatrix' son and attorney who claim
the proceeds of a transaction he handled for her as a gift) ; Crum v. Gilliam, 190 Va.
935, 59 S.E.2d 72 (1950) (suit to confirm deed to plaintiff by deceased wife).
Compare the Oregon rule that requires that the corroborative evidence establish a
prima facie case for the claimant. Seaton v. Security Savings and Trust Co., 131 Ore.
261, 282 Pac. 556 (1929) and Fields v. Rogers, 128 Ore. 661, 275 Pac. 598 (1929) so
construe Ore. Rev. Stat. § 116.555 (1953) which permits use of an interested party's
testimony only upon "some competent, satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of
the claimant." Thus the claimant's testimony can be used only for persuasion. The
Oregon rule seems distinguishable from the Ontario and Virginia rules on the wording of
the statutes.
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The New Mexico court has focused its attention on what must be corrobo2
rated, but has virtually ignored the question of sufficiency of corroboration. 1
28
Despite some unusual decisions, the quantity of corroborative evidence that is
required remains unclear.2 9 It is possible that the rule being followed is that the
corroborating evidence must be sufficient in and of itself to support the claim.
If this is true then the District of Columbia Court of Appeals correctly characterized the New Mexico rule when it said that it amounts "to saying that a
survivor's testimony may be considered only when it is not essential to the
8' 0
result." It correctly concluded that "such a view clearly nullifies the statute."
See Rosinski v. Whiteford, 184 F.2d 700, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1950) construing D.C. Code
Ann. § 14-302 (1951) which provides that "no judgment or decree shall be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff founded on the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff.
Accord, Davis v. Carmody, 154 A.2d 132 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959).
27. But see Gildersleeve v. Atkinson, 6 N.M. 250, 260, 27 Pac. 477, 480 (1891)
("The rule .. .goes simply to the introduction of the evidence, not to its weight. The
court is first to determine whether there is any corroborating evidence; its weight is
then for the jury." This seems to indicate that any amount of admissible evidence may
be sufficient.) Compare the statement in Lusk v. Daugherty, 61 N.M. 196, 203, 297 P.2d
333, 337 (1956) that the testimony offered in corroboration "if accepted by the court,
was of a character ... as did 'tend to prove the essential allegations or issue raised by
the pleadings' " and thus met the "statutory test of sufficiency." This seems to confuse
the two requirements of sufficiency and quality of the evidence recognized in the Gildersleeve case.
28. In Craig v. Cox, 56 N.M. 658, 248 P.2d 659 (19.50), evidence offered in corroboration was treated as if it must be sufficient to sustain the claim. The credibility of the
evidence offered in corroboration was considered and the corroborating evidence was
also weighed with other evidence offered to rebut the claim against the estate. A similar
attitude is illustrated by cases requiring the details of an oral agreement relied upon by
the claimant to be set out by corroborating evidence, thus making proof of such a claim
possible only on evidence independent of the claimant's. Vehn v. Bergman, 57 N.M. 351,
258 P.2d 734 (1953) ; Childers v. Hubbell, 15 N.M. 450, 110 Pac. 1051 (1910) ; compare
Craig v. Cox, 56 N.M. 658, 248 P.2d 659 (1950) which seemed to require that the corroborative evidence be precise and certain as to the terms of the agreement; cf. Rasmussen
v. Martin, 60 N.M. 180, 289 P.2d 327 (1955) (corroborative evidence relied upon did not
refer to details of oral agreement).
29. One writer has suggested that formulation of a general rule is useless since the
issue of sufficiency of corroboration is litigated in virtually every case under such a
statute. Legislation, Qualifying the Interested Survivor as a Witness, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
834, 835 n.12 (1933). For an example of the disparity of results in New Mexico compare
Rasmussen v. Martin, 60 N.M. 180, 289 P.2d 327 (1955) (corroborating testimony consisted of evidence that a transaction had taken place between plaintiff and decedent
without any details of the transaction) and In re Baldwin's Will, 58 N.M. 370, 371, 271
P.2d 404, 405 (1954) ("We agree with the jurors who tried the case that this was
sufficient corroboration .... [T]he jury evidently believed the statement" of the plaintiff)
with Vehn v. Bergman, 57 N.M. 351, 258 P.2d 734 (1953) (requiring the corroborating
evidence to set out the details of the oral agreement relied upon by plaintiff) and Craig
v. Cox, 56 N.M. 658, 248 P.2d 659 (1952) (rejecting other evidence relating to the details
of the alleged oral agreement).
30. Rosinski v. Whiteford, 184 F.2d 700, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The conclusion reached
by the District of Columbia court would be correct only if the evidence necessary to corroborate each essential allegation were required to be enough for the jury to find that fact.
It is conceivable that each allegation could be corroborated by evidence not sufficient for
the jury to find it to be true.
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The 1959 amendment to the New Mexico Dead Man Statute was drafted to
prevent the extreme results reached under the old statute. The amended
statute 3 1 provides that a claimant may not prevail on his own evidence unless it
is "supported by some other material evidence tending to corroborate the
claimant." (Emphasis supplied) This change was intended to prevent holdings
that require the corroborative evidence to be sufficient in itself to support the
claim.a 2 Furthermore, the provision that the testimony of the claimant need only

be "supported" by evidence "tending" to corroborate him suggests that corroborative evidence is sufficient if it supports the claimant's credibility and need no
longer independently corroborate the elements of his claim. 33 It is clear that the
amendment was intended to reject the definition of corroboration used in
Porter.3 4 The new language permits "a judgment based essentially on the survivor's testimony if there is other evidence from which reasonable men might
conclude that his testimony is probably true." 5 This view, originated by the
District of Columbia, should be adopted by New Mexico. 6
C. LERoy

HANSEN

31. Supra note 5.
32. See letter on file in Natural Resources Journal office, The University of New Mexico School of Law, from sponsor of amending bill in the legislature. The sponsor was
counsel for plaintiff in Porter v. Porter, 65 N.M. 14, 331 P.2d 360 (1959).
33. See text accompanying notes 19-25, supra.
34. Supra note 32.
35. Rosinski v. Whiteford, 184 F.2d 700, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1950) construing D.C. Code
Ann. § 14-302 (1951) which provides that "no judgment or decree shall be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff founded on the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff ... "
Accord, Davis v. Carmody, 154 A.2d 132 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959).
36. This standard is nearly identical to the standard used in most jurisdictions to
determine whether evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to decide a question of fact,
and thus should not be difficult to apply. McCormick, Evidence § 306, at 636 (1954)
states that test as follows: ". . . it must be such that a reasonable man could draw from
it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to be proved." See 9 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2494 at 299 & n. 17 (3d ed. 1940).
The similarity between the pre-amendment New Mexico statute, supra note 5, and
the Virginia, Ontario, and District of Columbia statutes supra note 26, and the liberal
constructions placed upon those statutes, indicate that the New Mexico position was
unreasonable before the amendment.
The only other context in which corroboration is used in New Mexico is regarding
the testimony of a complainant in a rape case. See e.g., State v. Baca, 56 N.M. 236, 242
P.2d 1002 (1952). Thus no New Mexico precedent stands in the way of the suggested
test.
It should not be overlooked that the New Mexico type statute has been attacked as
merely causing litigation. Legislation, Qualifying the Interested Survivor as a Witness,
46 Harv. L. Rev. 834 (1933). Also, even the liberal District of Columbia approach does
not answer the criticisms of Dead Man Statutes by leading scholars who recommend the
abolition of all such restrictions on the competency of witnesses. McCormick, Evidence
§ 65 (1954); Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 334 (1949);
Wigmore, Evidence § 578 (3d ed. 1940) ;Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further
Observations and a Legislative Proposal, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 207 (1941) ; Model Code of Evidence rule 101 (1942). Because of the other safeguards against fraud, such as cross-

